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Abstract
We study an economic model where agents trade a variety of products by using one
of three competing rules: “need”, “greed” and “noise”. We find that the optimal
strategy for any agent depends on both product composition in the overall market
and composition of strategies in the market. In particular, a strategy that does best
on pairwise competition may easily do much worse when all are present, leading, in
some cases, to a “paper, stone, scissors” circular hierarchy.
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1 Introduction
Human activity often takes the form of exchanges. These exchanges typically
consist of goods that can be quantified by value, but also opinions or other
types of information may be traded. The former define a market economy.
There have been several proposals to model such markets, see, for example
the review by Farmer [1]. Most of the proposed models aim at reproducing
the fat tails and volatility clustering in a stock or currency market [2,3,4,5,6].
Earlier we have proposed a market model (“Fat Cat” model) where agents
trade products according to individual price estimates. These estimates were
dynamically adjusted as a function of the trading encounters of each agent [7].
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The model mentioned above is one of many similar models that could be
considered for such a market, each model being distinguished by a strategy
that defines which product a buyer should select from a seller and how he
should price it later. In the present paper we study the interplay of a few
strategies. The relative performance of these strategies is quantified by the
wealth of agents employing them.
We organized the paper by first reviewing the “Fat Cat” model in section
II. The extension of this model to the case of other strategies is described in
section III. Then, in section IV we discuss how the model could be extended
to cases where agents are able to change their strategies according to their
performance and give our concluding remarks.
2 Rules of the game
We picture our model as a cartoon of the trading situations found in a real
market. As shown in fig. 1, this minimalistic model consists of a system where
agents trade a set of Npr different products. Each agent i is assigned one of
three possible strategies selected to be either based on profit (i.e. “greed”,
which is the strategy adopted in the original “Fat Cat” model), on the need
for a particular product, or on a random selection without regard to the level
of profit or need.
Other strategies could be explored; for example, agents could act as “garbage
collectors”, buying whatever product has the lowest possible price. In this
paper we limit ourselves to the three, probably most basic, strategies outlined
in fig. 1.
Each of the Nag agents starts with Nun units of goods. The goods are randomly
selected, for each agent, among the Npr different products. Thereby we form
the stock S of each agent that together with some initial amount of money,
Nmon define the initial state of the economy. We describe below the dynamics
that arises from the interactions among these agents.
During the time evolution of the system, each agent i has, at each time step,
an amount of money M(i), i = 1, ..., Nag, and a stock of the different products
j, S(i, j), where j = 1, ..., Npr. The prices of the different items in the stock of
agent i are denoted P (i, j) which initially are taken to be integers uniformly
drawn in the interval [1, 5]. In all cases we have verified that the evolution
of the system does not depend on this particular choice. Agents then meet
and exchange products and adjust prices. Price adjustment is such that large
differences in pricing between agents are lowered, but also such that price
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Fig. 1. Pictorial representation of the model. A buyer and a seller in a market with
Npr = 4 products meet. The buyer has one of products 1 and 3, two of product 2
and none of product 4. The seller, has one of products 1 and 4, two of product 3 and
none of product 2. The buyer values the four products at 8, 4, 1 and 4 units of money
and the seller values them at 5, 4, 2 and 3, respectively. The buyer compares his
price list for the four products with the seller’s price list, and according to strategy
proposes a deal.
differences are induced by some noise when they are small, as in real markets.
As in our simulations for the original “Fat Cat” model, we assume that at
each time step the following procedure takes place:
• 1 Buyer (b) and seller (s) are selected at random among the Nag agents. If
the seller has no products to offer, then another seller is chosen.
• 2 The buyer selects a product j in the seller’s stock according to his strategy
σ(i).
i) If strategy σ(i) is “Profit” then he selects the product j which maximizes
P (b, j)− P (s, j), (i.e. his profit).
ii) If strategy σ(i) is “Need” then he selects the product j which he has the
least in his stock (minimizes S(i, j)).
iii) If strategy σ(i) is “Random” then he selects a random product j in the
seller’s stock for which P (b, j)− P (s, j) > 0.
The selected product j is called jbb (best buy).
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• 3a If the buyer does not have enough money, (i.e. if M(b) < P (b, jbb), we
return to the first step and choose a new pair of agents.
• 3b If the buyer has enough money we proceed.
If P (s, jbb) < P (b, jbb), the transaction is performed at the seller’s price.
This means that we adjust: S(b, jbb)→ S(b, jbb)+1, S(s, jbb)→ S(s, jbb)−1,
M(b)→ M(b)− P (s, jbb), M(s)→ M(s) + P (s, jbb).
• 3c If P (s, jbb) ≥ P (b, jbb), the transaction is not performed. In this case, the
seller lowers his price by one unit, P (s, jbb)→ max(P (s, jbb)−1, 0), and the
buyer raises his price by one unit,
P (b, jbb)→ P (b, jbb) + 1.
The prices are always non-negative integers. Also note that since, as defined in
step 3 above, the price offered by the buyer cannot be higher than the amount
of money it has, we are not allowing for the agents to get into debt. In case
there are several products that fulfill the selection criterion in 2, a random one
of these is chosen. One should emphasize that due to the price adjustments
performed in unsuccessful encounters, the prices never reach equilibrium, and
different agents typically assign different prices to the same product.
To quantify the system, we define the total wealth of an agent i as the amount
of money plus the value of all goods in the agent’s possession:
W (i) = M(i) +G(i) (1)
The value of product j is defined as the average of what all agents consider
its value to be:
Pave(j) =
1
Nag
Nag∑
i=1
P (i, j), (2)
and the value of all of agent i’s goods, G(i) is defined as
G(i) =
∑
j
S(i, j)Pave(j) . (3)
The “Fat Cat” model’s “profit” rule was studied extensively in our earlier pa-
per. There it was found to lead to persistency and fat tails in the agents’ wealth
fluctuations with time, hence its name. We now study the other strategies and
their interactions.
3 Fixed Strategies
The three strategies given above lead to different wealth of the respective
agents. We will now study this in some detail. Our first step is to illustrate
how the wealth of the agents gets distributed in a system where all agents
employ the same strategy. For that purpose we consider a system composed of
4
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Fig. 2. Wealth distribution for all agents employing either of the three strategies
described in the text. The parameter values for the simulations were Nag = Npr50,
and, initially, Nun = 40, M = 20 per agent.
50 agents, 50 different products. Each agent is given 40 units of products and
20 units of money. The result, shown in fig. 2, is that there are appreciable
differences in the wealth distribution according to the strategy. For a profit-
minded system (the original “Fat Cat” model), there is a long tail of wealthy
agents, which becomes less pronounced when the strategy is based on the stock
needs. In this case there are no rich agents, but instead a large concentration
of middle-wealth agents. If the strategy adopted is to buy a random product,
the long tail disappears and the middle-wealth peak is shifted to lower values
than in the previous case.
The situation can change when the economic conditions, as defined by the
number of units of products and money in the economy, are changing. We
will show that there is no best rule for all situations This is shown in fig.
3, where we have changed the number of units of products, while keeping
all other model values the same, in markets composed of equal numbers of
agents employing two different strategies. In this case, where Nun < Npr, each
agent has a few of many possible products, thus representing an antique dealer
market where there are many special items and no one can have everything.
We see, in the upper panel, that for this market the “need” strategy, is better
than “profit” above 10 units. However, below 10 units, the result is unstable,
one strategy leading to better results than the other depending on the initial
conditions. In the middle panel we see that the “random” agents have a higher
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Fig. 3. Pairwise competition between strategies as a function of the number of units
of goods in the limit when there are few copies of each good (“antique market”). In
all cases the total number of agents, products and initial units of money per agent
are the same as in Fig. 2.
average wealth than the “profit” motivated ones when the number of units is
above 45, the situation is reversed for a number of units below 35, and there
is unpredictability in between these two values. Finally, the lower panel shows
that “need” works better than a “random” strategy for all number of units
in the range shown. For other parameter values, namely when the number
of units of products and money is large, the “random” strategy outperforms
“need”.
In this last case, namely for Nun >> Npr, each agent typically has many copies
of all products, which represent a mass production market with many copies
of few items; A supermarket world. In this case, a pairwise comparison of the
three strategies shows an interesting situation, depicted in fig. 4: “need” out-
performs “profit”, which outperforms “random”, which outperforms “need”.
So, in this case no strategy is better than both of the other strategies when
studied pairwise.
In fig. 5 we explore the triple market further, implementing a market where
there is only one agent with “need” strategy among 25 agents with “profit” and
25 agents with “noise” as strategies, so that there are all together 51 agents.
Without the single “need” strategy, “random” would outperform “profit” with
a large margin. A single “need” agent in the system will slowly collect a large
fraction of all products in the market. This is because it has a large competition
advantage over the “profit”, which overcompensates its disadvantage to the
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Fig. 4. Pairwise competition between strategies for a rich market, in which each
agent has initially Nun = M = 400. The remaining parameters are the same as in
Fig. 3. Here we find the circular hierarchy “need” > “profit”, “profit” > “random”,
and “random” > “need”.
“random” ones. If the number of “profit” agents were reduced and that of the
“random” agents increased, the “need” agent would do worse. This illustrates
the fact that the number of agents employing the different strategies is also
determinant in the relative success of the agents adopting them.
4 Outlook and conclusions
As we have seen, one may have different strategies for different agents. An
interesting direction to extend this model is to let the agents to select the
strategies they adopt in order to improve their performance. A further exten-
sion development would be to allow the strategies themselves to evolve. In
the following we show a preliminary example of how the agents could choose
strategies.
A simple mechanism consists in updating, at fixed time intervals, the strategy
of the poorest agent in the system. This agent just changes his present strategy
to any of the other two, at random. The resulting time evolution for a system
composed of 45 agents initially equally distributed according to their strategies
is shown in fig. 6. We see that, after an initial transient, the number of agents
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Fig. 5. a) Competition between 25 agents employing the “profit” strategy with
a similar number of “random” agents, in the same rich market as in Fig. 4. b)
Competition where a single “need” agent is introduced into the system of the panel
above. Note that this agent gathers so much wealth that he rapidly grows out of
the scale of the illustration.
following the “need” and “random” strategies becomes approximately equal
and constant for a considerable period of time, while the “profit” strategy is
followed by a small fraction of the agents. An increase in the “profit” agents
leads to a change in the conditions which lead the “random” strategy to almost
disappear from the system, to a dominance of “need”, and the persistency of
“profit” at a very low level. From the fig. 4 we see that were it not for the
existence of “profit”-thinking agents, “random” would dominate over “need”.
The results shown in fig. 6 also demonstrate that the hierarchy “paper — stone
— scissors” illustrated in fig. 4, for the same system, does not seem to lead, in
the time interval considered, to alternations in the number of agents employ-
ing each strategy. There could be several reasons for this. One is that these
changes take longer and longer time to alter enough the market conditions
to significantly modify the performance of the different strategies. Another
is that while in fig. 4 one measures the average wealth of the agents using
each of the three strategies, the criterium for changing strategies is based on
the performance of poor agents, i.e. on the agents’ wealth distribution in the
region close to the origin. As suggested by fig. 2, a strategy yielding a higher
average wealth than another, may also have a larger number of poor agents
than the other. These issues need to be further explored for an appropriate
strategy selection procedure and will be discussed in the future.
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Fig. 6. Number of agents employing each or the three strategies as a function of
time. The model parameters are the same as in Figs. 4 and 5.
Compared to earlier models of market dynamics the model presented here
has some new and related key features: there is local optimization of utility
(estimated market value) and all trades are done locally without the equi-
librizing effects of a global information pool. This gives arbitrage possibility
which drives a dynamic and evolving market. Earlier market models, such as
the minority game, have a global information pool, and lack dynamical signals
that could be associated with stock market fluctuations. The evolving Boolean
network for minority games of Paczuski, Bassler and Corral [6], on the other
hand, works with local information exchange, but the reward function is still
global. Also the frame of minority games makes it difficult to treat a multi-
product market, which we believe is important for understanding real stock
markets.
The model we propose is for a market composed of agents, goods and money
(or People, Prices and Products). We have demonstrated that such a market
easily shows persistent fluctuations of wealth with time, and seen that the
persistency is closely related to an interplay of having many products that
influence each others trade probability. A similar result was obtained in the
simpler model in [8], where it was demonstrated that persistency could arise
even without money. The setup proposed here with agents and products with
individual local prices allows for individual strategies of the agents. This opens
for evolution of strategy as a part of the financial market, and we have seen
that evolving strategies indeed give a dynamics where wealth is often rapidly
redistributed.
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